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The Problem
Current methods of finding landmines, based largely on metal de-
tection and careful digging, are not completely satisfactory. Various 
other techniques are being used or under study—notably ground-pene-
trating-radar, neutron and magnetometry methods. As discussed below, 
soil moisture has an adverse effect on the first two techniques. 
Ground-penetrating radar. Unlike pulsed radar, continuous-wave 
radars work by transmitting at a certain frequency (typically for a mil-
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Metal detection and digging are somewhat unsatisfactory approaches to locating landmines. This report 
presents and examines alternative detection solutions, such as ground-penetrating radar as well as neutron and 
magnetometry methods. A case study of these techniques in a laboratory setting and in Egyptian soil reveals 
their effectiveness.
lisecond) and then stepping to the next frequency. The reflected signal 
is measured in amplitude and phase at each frequency and stored. Af-
ter the specified frequencies (typically 256) have been scanned, a fast 
Fourier transform is carried out on a laptop. This converts from frequency 
information to time (i.e., space) information, which is displayed to the 
operator on a laptop screen. GPRs detect discontinuities in the soil’s di-
electric constant, such as a landmine. In nonmagnetic soil, radio fre-
quency energy penetrates a distance set by the  “skin depth”         
hyDaD-D (left) and Pris (right) devices, with their operating crews. the string marking the test lane can be seen in both images. a minor 
problem was reading hyDaD-D’s oscilloscope screen in strong sunlight.
all Photos courtesy of John f. craWforD
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where      is the soil resistivity, λ is the RF wave-
length and    is the impedance of free space 
(about 120π  Ω). With increasing soil mois-
ture, both     and δ diminish, and the RF does 
not penetrate the ground very well.
Neutron methods. Explosives contain 
significant amounts of hydrogen; for exam-
ple, TNT contains 2.2% hydrogen by weight, 
or, more meaningfully, 24% by number. 
Therefore explosives moderate neutrons ef-
fectively. This effect can be exploited for ex-
plosive detection as follows: Fast neutrons 
from a suitable source, such as Californium or 
Americium-Beryllium, are moderated by the 
soil, and then detected by slow neutron coun-
ters (usually 3He proportional counters). An 
excess of hydrogen, e.g., in a mine’s explosive, 
will yield an enhanced count rate. However, 
this effect depends on the soil not contain-
ing too much hydrogen, the presence of which 
will prevent the neutrons from penetrating 
and will moderate them, weakening and ob-
scuring the signal. Thus in soil containing the 
same amount of hydrogen as the explosive, 
e.g., as water, there will be no signal.
Magnetometry. Magnetometry is an es-
tablished technique in archaeology. In addi-
tion to finding very small amounts of iron, a 
magnetometer is sensitive to rust. Thus even 
heavily corroded steel mines, such as those 
commonly found in North Africa, should be 
detectable.
Type Quantity Charge weight Total weight Comments
APM VS-50 2 43 g 185 g w/o 18 g metal plate
PMN 2 240 g 600 g
Box 2 ca 200 g N/A 1 wood, 1 plastic
ATM T-80 2 4.5 kg N/A plastic
TM-46 1 5.7 kg 8.6 kg steel
Israel 1 10.5 kg N/A steel
M-71 1 6.25 kg 9.8 kg steel
Mk-7 1 8.89 kg 13.6 kg steel
table 1: available anti-personnel and anti-tank mines.
all taBles courtesy of John f. craWforD/cisr
No. Object Depth (cm) HYDAD-D PRIS GPR Depth (cm) Remarks
0 DLM-2 0 See note 0
1 Scrap 0 False Positive False Positive 5-10
2 PMN 20 True Positive True Positive 15
3 Empty True Negative True Negative
4 PMN 10 True Positive True Positive 20
5 VS-50 20 True Positive False Negative See note 5
6 Scrap 20 True Negative False Positive 5-10
7 Empty False Positive True Negative
8 Empty True Negative False Positive 15 See note 8
9 Empty True Negative True Negative
10 Scrap 10 True Negative False Positive 15
11 Box 0 True Positive True Positive 5-10 Wood
12 VS-50 10 True Negative True Positive 15 See note 12
Notes:
0. DLM-2 was a small dummy landmine supplied by the IAEA; it was visible, and was used for calibration only
5. See second bullet under Comments and Conclusions.
8. Although this position was nominally empty, three soft-drink ring-pulls were buried here
12. HYDAD-D was misbehaving during this measurement, the last of the trial; on its return to Cape Town it turned out to have a 
fault that might have caused it to miss this mine.
table 2: aPM lane results. column 3 shows the cover depth; column 6 the depth estimated by Pris. 
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Egypt as a Test Area
Both GPR and neutron methods should perform better where the soil 
is dry, as is the case in North Africa for most of the year. Beyond that, 
magnetometry should be effective against the steel-cased mines that are 
common there. Given the successful tests of these techniques in the lab-
oratory,1 a natural next step appeared to be to organize a combined test 
in Egypt of as many devices as possible, especially GPR and neutron 
methods. The idea was first discussed at the International Atomic Ener-
gy Agency’s Technical Meeting on Combined Devices for Humanitarian 
Demining and Explosives Detection in Padova, Italy, in November 2006, 
where many of the laboratory tests were reported.
Three stepped-frequency continuous-wave GHz GPRs were avail-
able. A team from Raumfahrt Systemtechnik in Salem, Germany, brought 
two such devices, both of which they had designed and built: the Hand-
held Operational Demining System (HOPE) and Potash Roof Inspection 
System.2 HOPE works from 2 to 6 GHz and PRIS from 0.55 to 3.8 GHz. 
Beyond that, the Egyptian National Research Institute of Astronomy 
and Geophysics provided a Geophysical Survey Systems, Inc. MF20 GPR 
working at 0.1 to 0.8 GHz and 1 to 2 GHz, and a fluxgate magnetometer. 
Two neutron detectors were available: the Hydrogen Density Anomaly 
Detector-D3 from the University of Cape Town, South Africa, and the 
Egyptian Scanning Landmine Detector (ESCALAD),4 built by a collab-
oration of Dutch and Egyptian institutes.
Methodology
In a convenient part of the Inshas Centre of the Egyptian Atomic 
Energy Authority, two test lanes were marked out in flat, dry, sandy soil 
by means of strings stretched between pegs. Every 2 m, a position was 
marked with a knot. At each position an object could be buried (either a 
mine or scrap metal) or else nothing was buried there; selection among 
these three options was done at random. Objects were covered to depths 
of 0, 10 or 20 cm, again at random. Surface objects were covered by just 
enough soil to conceal them. The soil at empty positions was disturbed 
enough to avoid providing a visual clue. The trials were “single blind” in 
the sense that the testees were not told which objects were in which posi-
tions. Five anti-personnel mines and five anti-tank mines (see Table 1 on 
previous page) were buried in the test lanes; two additional mines were 
required for simultaneous tests with other equipment. The two photos 
on the previous page show HYDAD-D and PRIS with their operators. 
Test Lane Results
Table 2 (previous page), and 3 (above) show the results of the above 
tests. Neither HYDAD-D nor PRIS detects landmines as such; rather 
they detect proxies in the form of hydrogen anomalies and radar reflec-
tions, respectively. Accordingly, the statements “Positive” and “Neg-
ative” in the Tables refer to the apparent presence or absence of these 
proxies. “True” and “False,” on the other hand, refer to the presence or 
absence of a mine.
The following are remarks on the APM test lane results:
• The Dimension Laser Metrology-2 calibrator was 4 m away from 
Position 1; the other positions were 2 m apart.
• HYDAD-D took about 30 minutes to measure each position on 
the APM lane; this can be improved to only a few minutes.5
• PRIS took less than 60 minutes to measure all 12 positions in a 
lane; these results are more fully described elsewhere.6
• The MF20 GPR made a scan of the whole lane in only a few minutes.
The following are remarks on the ATM test lane results:
• In a separate test, HYDAD-D saw such a strong signal from some 
of these mines that the signal confused part of the software.
• In a separate test in a different area of the test field, PRIS missed one 
of the T-80 mines, apparently because a cover plate was missing.
table 3: atM lane results. column 3 shows the cover depth; column 5 the depth estimated by Pris. Because of the size of these mines, 
there were no false results and Pris was able to estimate their depths fairly well. time did not permit hyDaD-D to be tested on this lane. 
No. Object Depth (cm) PRIS GPR Depth (cm)
1 M-71 21 True Positive 15
2 T-80 21 True Positive 20
3 Empty True Negative
4 Empty True Negative
5 TM-46 35 True Positive 30
6 Mk-7 27 True Positive 20-25
7 Empty True Negative
8 Empty True Negative
9 Empty True Negative
10 Israel 30 True Positive 25
11 Empty True Negative
12 Empty True Negative
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Extra Results
Although the trial concentrated on the 
test lanes, some further useful results were 
obtained:
• As an exercise, a PMN was buried 
15 cm deep. The PRIS GPR was used to 
scan the area in the manner of a metal 
detector. The PMN was found with no 
difficulty.
• A fluxgate magnetometer belonging to 
the National Research Institute of As-
tronomy and Geophysics could detect 
steel ATMs at several meters. A cae-
sium magnetometer—some orders of 
magnitude more sensitive—is on order.
Comments and Conclusions
A number of conclusions came out of this 
testing, including the following:
• As expected, the dry Egyptian soil 
made it easier to detect the mines. 
• A VS-50, well-known as a difficult 
mine for conventional metal detectors, 
was seen at a depth of at least 20  cm 
by HYDAD-D. Those involved in this 
work believe this to be a record. Given 
that the VS-50s provided were not fitted 
with optional metal plates,7 this result 
may be competitive with what conven-
tional metal detectors would have been 
able to do.
• Because Egyptian soil is dryer than 
even a comparable sandy European 
soil, PRIS was able to see about 0.7 m 
into the ground—about twice as deep 
as in Europe.
• The University of Cape Town’s HYDAD-
D device and the RST GPRs were trans-
ported as normal airline luggage—not 
even as excess baggage in the HYDAD-
D case, because some standard elec-
tronic units that the device needed 
were available in Cairo. However, a few 
small obstacles were encountered. The 
equipment brought in from Europe and 
South Africa was held up overnight by 
customs at Cairo Airport, because the 
official on duty lacked the authority 
to clear the equipment. On release the 
next morning, the RST radars—HOPE 
and PRIS—had to be unpacked, reas-
sembled and switched on. HYDAD-D 
had to be unpacked, reassembled, con-
nected to equipment supplied in Cairo, 
and switched on. After minor problems 
were overcome, the equipment was as-
sembled and worked more or less nom-
inally. This indicates the equipment’s 
state of development. HOPE and PRIS 
worked as expected; their antennas 
have since been redesigned, partly as a 
result of this test. 
• The weather during our test (4–8 No-
vember 2007) was excellent for our 
purposes: sunny, not hot by local stan-
dards, with light winds.
• ESCALAD gave a great deal of trouble, 
apparently due to interference from 
a nearby radio transmitter, to dust in 
electrical connectors, and to a mis-
match between the strength of its neu-
tron source and its minimum practica-
ble speed. ESCALAD is the first device 
of its kind, and this was its first field 
trial after satisfactory laboratory tests.8
• In part because of this work, improve-
ments have been made to the equipment. 
A further test, also involving γ backscat-
tering and Superconducting Quantum 
Interference Device magnetometry is 
planned for November 2010. 
See Endnotes, Page 82
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